Pakistan China JF-17 is Reverse Engineered Mig 33 and F-16.
JF 17 comares to :
Mig 33, Dassault Mirage 2000, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-20 Tigershark,HAL Tejas
IAR 95, JAS-39 Gripen, Chengdu J-10
The PAC JF-17 Thunder is a 3.5 to 4-generation single-seat multi-role fighter aircraft jointly developed by China and Pakistan. The "JF" designations stand for "Joint Fighter". The first two aircraft were delivered to the Pakistan Air Force on 2007-03-12. The JF-17 is designed to be a cost-effective plane which can meet the tactical and strategic needs of air forces of developing countries. On January 22, 2008, Pakistan started serial production of the aircraft at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra.
Development and history
The JF-17 is being built by China's Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). The project is expected to cost about US$500 million, divided equally between China and Pakistan, while each individual aircraft is expected to have a fly-away cost of US$8-15 million.
The JF-17 Thunder initial development project was completed in a period of four years.However, later improvements to the project has taken up more time. Pakistan has announced that it will procure 150, but this may easily go up to 300. The JF-17 will replace Pakistan's MiG-21-derived Chengdu F-7, Nanchang A-5 (Q-5) and Mirage III/V currently in service. Azerbaijan and Zimbabwe have each placed orders as well.[8] 9 other countries which have expressed interest in purchasing the JF-17 are Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia[9], Morocco, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, plus Algeria, which has reversed the decision of opting the latest MiG-29UBS.
A pair of JF-17 Thunders fly by during the National Day Joint Services Parade on 23 March 2007.
In 1986, China signed an agreement with Grumman to develop an upgrade for the J-7 known as the "Saber II", the replacement of the abandoned "Super 7" upgrade of J-7. The program was cancelled in 1990, primarily due to worsening relations with the U.S. following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. However, CAC kept the program alive by providing low-level funding from its own resources.
After U.S. sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in 1990, Pakistan also became interested in the project.
The first prototype was rolled out on May 31, 2003, conducted its first taxi trials on July 1, and made its first flight on August 25 of the same year. Prototype 03 made its first flight in April 2004. On April 28, 2006, Prototype 04 made its first flight with fully operational avionics.
Serial production has begun in June 2006, and the first 16 aircraft will be rolled out in early 2007. Serial production during 2007-2008 will be at an annual 10-15 planes per year, while from 2009+ it will be at 25-30 planes per year.
The President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, declared in his Independence Day speech on August 14, 2006 that the JF-17 will be flying in Pakistani skies by March 23, 2007. The first 2 JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft were delivered to Pakistan Air Force on 2007-03-12 while the remainder of the first batch of 8 aircraft will arrive later in the same year. The JF-17 Thunder aircraft had its first public appearance in Islamabad, on March 23, 2007 during a fly-past performance in the Pakistan Day Joint Services Parade in Islamabad.
On 2007-03-31, Pakistan Air Force Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mahmood Ahmed said, "PAF would soon induct fourth and fifth generation high-tech fleet of fighter-bomber aircraft with the aim to modernize the country’s air force which includes the induction of 10 to 12 squadrons of JF-17 Thunder aircraft." He also said, during this year, six more JF-17 aircraft would be received from China, as in 2008 the serial production of the aircraft would commence at Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra, Pakistan. The PAF Chief said, 15 aircraft would be manufactured in 2008, while 20 in the next year with the aim to achieve capability to manufacture 25 to 30 aircraft per year, also hinting the PAF was set to acquire up to 250 JF-17 Thunder aircraft.
The ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz in a recent press conference held in Islamabad, Pakistan after the visit of China termed the project as JF-17 was "Pakistan’s proud programme and a unique example of cooperation and friendship between the two countries". He also said that serial production of JF-17 Thunder aircraft would soon start next year and Pakistan would like to sell fourth generation JF-17 Multirole Aircraft to those interested. The Prime Minister also confirmed that JF-17 Thunder aircraft in Pakistan had also completed 500 combat missions and sorties.
Design
Looking at the status of the development's work, the fourth prototype version of the JF-17 Thunder combat jet has successfully completed its first operational flight in Chengdu, China, on Wednesday, 2006-03-10.[14] The 4th prototype of the JF-17 Thunder combat jet is configured as a multi-role fighter-bomber and is capable of carrying multiple air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The fighter jet is equipped with advanced electronics and weapons systems. Pakistan received the first consignment of 2 aircraft on 2007-03-23, while the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra will start manufacturing the JF-17 in 2008. China will start official production in June 2007.
The fourth prototype version is said to be redesigned with F-35 style Divertless Supersonic Intakes (DSIs) being the most notable feature; according to Lockheed Martin, DSIs are more stealthy than other conventional air intakes as well as DSIs also divert turbulent boundary-layer airflow away from the engine inlet[15][16]
At the Sixth Zhuhai Airshow in China, a Unit Training Device (UTD) appearing identical to the earlier mockup of the JF-17 was publicly displayed, and the manufacturer of the aircraft, along with other manufacturers of airborne weaponry, provided more detailed information on the projects:
Avionics
The software of JF-17 totaled more than one million lines of instructions, incorporating the concept of open architecture. Instead of using the common Ada, the programming language of JF-17 software is written in C++ instead. The reason for using C++ instead of Ada was due to practice of the commercial off-the-shelf to better utilize the large number of civilian software programmers available. The avionics of JF-17 prototypes was based on Motorola 88000 microprocessor originally, but can be changed to other types of the same class. The 4th prototype includes advanced avionics features.
JF-17 Thunder is an all-weather, multipurpose light fighter aircraft. The aircraft is equipped with advanced avionics and armed with medium-range missiles. It is capable of carrying out both air-to-air and air-to-groud missions.
By 2004 this new multi-role fighter had been redesignated the Xialon (Fierce Dragon), and for Pakistan as JF-17 "Thunder". It might be designated J-9 when it becomes operational.
Super-7 (Chao Qi)
In 1986, China signed a $550 million agreement with Grumman to modernize 55 of its fleet of J-7 fighters under the so-called "Super-7" upgrade, but this agreement was canceled in early 1990, in the wake of the cooling of political relations with the West, as well as in response to a 40% increase in the cost of the project.
The "SUPER-7" was the first fighter jet completely designed and manufactured by China. Super-7 (Chao Qi) fighter is China's new generation fighter and the first of its kind of the nation's own intellectual property rights. The third-generation fighter plane, which can carry 3.8 tons of missiles, also has improved systems for attacking ground targets. Its advanced radar positioning and operating systems give the plane greater flexibility and better close-range manoeuvrability.
Development of the "Super 7" upgrade was slowed with the end of American technical assistance following the Tienanmen repression of 1989. Pakistan and China foreclosed the option of producing F-Super 7 Aircraft due to non-availability of Engines. It had been planned around MiG 27 Engine which the Russians refused to supply.
FC-1 (Fighter China 1)
As a substitute for the Super-7, China is developing the FC-1 (Fighter China 1) lightweight multipurpose fighter based on the design for the MiG-33, which was rejected by the Soviet Air Force. The FC-1 is being developed with a total investment in excess of $500 million, including support from the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), mainly for export to replace the 120 F-7M/P fighters currently in service in the Pakistani Air Force, though it is possible that the Chinese Air Force will use this aircraft as well. The deal to manufacture 150 FC-1 (Fighter China) jets was struck when General Musharraf visited China just before the Kargil war in 1998.
Chengdu Aircraft Industry Company [CAIC], based in Sichuan Province, is China's second-largest fighter production base, and the enterprise is cooperating with Pakistan's Aviation Integrated Company and Russia's Mikoyan Aero-Science Production Group [MASPG] in the development of the FC-1. Israel and several European countries are being considered as suppliers for the plane's avionics. The first flight was planned for 1997 with delivery to the Pakistani Air Force scheduled for 1999.
Initially it was anticipated that the FC-1 would be a high- performance, low-cost fighter plane to supplement the F-10 air superiority fighters developed for the Chinese Air Force. These planes will be fitted with a single Klimov Design Bureau RD-93 engines. They are a more powerful version of RD-33 engines, two of which are fitted in MIG-29.
It is widely reported that the FC-1 is a continuation of the "MiG-33 [R33]" program developed in the 1980s. The Russian company Mikoyan OKB Design Bureau, which designs all MIG series of aircraft, sold the design of MIG-33 to the China and Pakistan. This report is the source of considerable confusion, and indeed some rather fanciful speculation. The so-called MiG-33 design used in conjunction with the FC-1 program was apparently a the poorly attested "Product 33" lightweight single-engine project of the mid-1980s. A decade later, the MiG-33 nomenclature was briefly associated with the much larger twin-engine Mig-29M. This confused history has led to observations that the "FC-1 features air inlets on the lateral sides of the fuselage rather than the ventral inlets of the MiG-33. ... the most apparent modifications to the MiG-33 design is the repositioning of the ventral fins from the engine compartment..." These supposed modifications to the mid-90s MiG-33 design actually reflect the fact that the FC-1 is an entirely difference airplane with no design relationship to the MiG-33 [MiG-29M].
These improvement in performance have affected the program's costs, and if the final production order if fewer than 300 aircraft the unit price will rise from the original $10 million to $15 million.
The China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) is trying to persuade the Chinese Air Force to use the FC-1 so as to increase the production run and reduce the unit cost. But the Chinese military has resisted, being of the view that equiping the Air Force with two types of fighter planes with similar performance within the same time period would both consume limited financial resources and complicate logistical support for dissimilar aircraft.
The FC-1 was to make it's first flight in 1996, but the project was delayed when Pakistan sought to upgrade the performance characteristics of the FC-1 to respond to India's acquisition of Su-30MKIs. After several years of stagnation, the Pakistani Prime Minister's February 1998 trip to China resulted in an agreement to continue development of the fighter. Currently Pakistan is interested in acquiring at least 150 fighters, with the Chinese contemplating acquiring over 200.
The JF-17 Thunder project has been completed in a record period of four years. China National Aviation Corp officially signed the development contract for the FC-1 airplane in 1999. The project initially suffered a setback due to imposition of sanctions in 1999, which hindered acquisition of avionics and weaponry for the aircraft. The avionics had to be delinked from airframe development in 2001. China National Aviation Corp completes the detailed preliminary design in 2001 and in 2002 the company completed the detailed design structure and the system charts.
Formal production work began September 16, 2002, on the FC-1 aircraft in Chengdu, capital of southwest China's Sichuan Province.
The FC-1 made its formal debut at China's Fourth International Air Show scheduled November 4 to 7, 2002, in Zhuhai, the nearest mainland city to Macao. China Aviation Industry Corporation I (AVIC I ) made fresh progress in 2003, with 5 planes having passed evaluation and seven new planes completed their maiden flight. "Xiaolong/FC-1", or fierce dragon, produced by the corporation last year was applauded as one of the "Ten Major National Scientific Events in 2003"
In July 2003 it was reported that the "SUPER-7" fighter jet was ready to take its maiden flight, although a detailed timetable was not released. China's Super-7 Fighter completed its taxiing test on July 03, 2003 at a test ground of Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation (CAC). As one of the eight major ground tests that must be completed before test flight, the taxiing test is aimed at trying the correctness of the design of electricity supply system, as well as signal connections between the electricity supply system and other external systems so as to provide important data to guarantee a successful first fly. Leiqiang, deputy director of the Chengdu Flight Group's trial flight department under the Chinese Air Force, said on Tuesday he will carry out the maiden flight task. On the day of the first flight, China Central Television (CCTV) will dispatch a special report group to broadcast the whole flight live. Leiqiang, also a "SUPER-7" pilot, and Yangwei, the jet's designer, who is also regarded as the father of "SUPER-7," will be featured on the CCTV program "Face to Face."
On 25 August 2003 the "owlet dragon" FC-1 airplane carried on the initial flight. It flews 17 minutes before it returned to the airport.
The serial production of the aircraft will begin by January 2006. The aircraft will replace the Mirage, F-16 and F-7 aircraft with the latest technology and it will meet professional requirements of the Pakistan Air Force.
The JF-17 Thunder, whose performance is matched only by F-16s in the Pakistan Air Force's current inventory, would be replacing the aging fleet of Mirage, F-7s and A-5s. The aircraft is being considered as a match for the Indian Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which is expected to form the backbone of the Indian Air Force in future. There are, however, some features like advanced and futuristic avionics and cost effectiveness that give the JF-17 an edge over the LCA.
The JF-17 is a light weight, all weather, multi-role aircraft having a capability to fly at a speed of Mach 1.6 and a high thrust to weight ratio. The aircraft has the ability to engage targets at all speeds and altitudes within the conventional flying envelope. In the surface attack and interdiction role, the aircraft can strike at long distances. The combat jet has been installed with an advanced flight control system, which is a mix of conventional and fly-by-wire controls, making it highly agile and manoeuvrable.
The aircraft would be capable of carrying short-range, beyond visual range, anti-ship as well as anti-radiation missiles. Additionally, the carriage of high and low drag bombs, laser guided bombs, run away penetration bombs and cluster bombs would be catered for. However, the air chief parried a question regarding the aircraft's ability to carry nukes.
This machines has prominent maneuver cabability, greater range, airborne period and combat radius, fine short distance take off and landing characteristic and stronger weapon carrying capacity. The prominent center low altitude and the high subsonic maneuver operational capacity, has a better interception and to the place attack capability, all-weather, single shot, single-seat. This machine uses nearby the medium aspect ratio the strip wing normal arrangement, entire machine has 7 outside viewpoints, may be hanging many kinds of empty, the open area weapon, and may outside hang 3 auxiliary oil tanks, outside hangs the ability 3,600 kilograms.
This machine has used the advanced air operated contour and the big thrust force, the low consumption turbofan engine, as well as the advanced digital fax flies controls the system, the integrated aviation electron and the armament system, has in the launch to be apart from the ball, to realize the multi- goals beyond line of sight attack ability, has many kinds of advanced precise function and so on navigation, battlefield situation sensation, target detection and recognition, operational attack as well as electronic warfare.
Because has used the contemporary advanced design and the manufacture technology, the owlet dragon/FC-1 airplane had achieved the third generation fighter aircraft synthesis fighting efficiency, can contend with with now the advanced fighter aircraft, simultaneously has the low cost the characteristic, completely adapts the modern warfare request and the military airplane market demand.
The Pak Tribune reported on April 29, 2004 that the first eight of these aircraft would be delivered to the PLAAF in 2006.
J-9
The J-9 designation was apparently initially applied to an unbuilt single engined development of the J-8 aircraft that was cancelled in development around 1979. The F-9 FANTAN designation was at one time applied to the Q-5 FANTAN attack aircraft. Should the FC-1 enter PLAAF service, it might carry the J-9 designation.
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Monday, July 21, 2008
Pakistan to sell Sri Lanka US $60 Million
Pakistan to sell Sri Lanka US $60 Million according to a report in Defence Assistance, Reports Jane's Defence Weekly.
Sri Lanka is looking to Pakistan to significantly strengthen its military capabilities amid the increasing prospect of renewed civil war, revealed in documents obtained exclusively by Jane’s Defence Weekly.
According to high-level discussions detailed in the documents, Sri Lanka has asked Pakistan to facilitate the purchase of defence equipment worth around USD60 million.
The Jane’s Defence Weekly report says Sri Lanka has asked that their requests be given the ‘utmost priority’ amid a deteriorating security situation and a fragile ceasefire.
The army’s shopping list has a combined value of USD20 million, while the air force’s requirements are worth a further USD38.1 million.
Jane’s Defence Weekly says that Sri Lanka is clearly looking to build up its military capacity and has also issued a plea to Pakistan to provide swift technical assistance for its T-55 main battle tanks and C-130 transport aircraft.
The army’s extensive wish list includes ten Baktar Shikan anti-tank guided missile weapon systems, 300 standard/tandem warheads and two training simulators; respectively worth USD1.5 million, USD4.5 million and USD120,000. (ENDS)
Sri Lanka is looking to Pakistan to significantly strengthen its military capabilities amid the increasing prospect of renewed civil war, revealed in documents obtained exclusively by Jane’s Defence Weekly.
According to high-level discussions detailed in the documents, Sri Lanka has asked Pakistan to facilitate the purchase of defence equipment worth around USD60 million.
The Jane’s Defence Weekly report says Sri Lanka has asked that their requests be given the ‘utmost priority’ amid a deteriorating security situation and a fragile ceasefire.
The army’s shopping list has a combined value of USD20 million, while the air force’s requirements are worth a further USD38.1 million.
Jane’s Defence Weekly says that Sri Lanka is clearly looking to build up its military capacity and has also issued a plea to Pakistan to provide swift technical assistance for its T-55 main battle tanks and C-130 transport aircraft.
The army’s extensive wish list includes ten Baktar Shikan anti-tank guided missile weapon systems, 300 standard/tandem warheads and two training simulators; respectively worth USD1.5 million, USD4.5 million and USD120,000. (ENDS)
Pakistan to sell Sri Lanka US $60 Million in Defence Assistance, Reports Jane's Defence Weekly
Sri Lanka is looking to Pakistan to significantly strengthen its military capabilities amid the increasing prospect of renewed civil war, revealed in documents obtained exclusively by Jane’s Defence Weekly.
According to high-level discussions detailed in the documents, Sri Lanka has asked Pakistan to facilitate the purchase of defence equipment worth around USD60 million.
The Jane’s Defence Weekly report says Sri Lanka has asked that their requests be given the ‘utmost priority’ amid a deteriorating security situation and a fragile ceasefire.
The army’s shopping list has a combined value of USD20 million, while the air force’s requirements are worth a further USD38.1 million.
Jane’s Defence Weekly says that Sri Lanka is clearly looking to build up its military capacity and has also issued a plea to Pakistan to provide swift technical assistance for its T-55 main battle tanks and C-130 transport aircraft.
The army’s extensive wish list includes ten Baktar Shikan anti-tank guided missile weapon systems, 300 standard/tandem warheads and two training simulators; respectively worth USD1.5 million, USD4.5 million and USD120,000. (ENDS)
Sri Lanka is looking to Pakistan to significantly strengthen its military capabilities amid the increasing prospect of renewed civil war, revealed in documents obtained exclusively by Jane’s Defence Weekly.
According to high-level discussions detailed in the documents, Sri Lanka has asked Pakistan to facilitate the purchase of defence equipment worth around USD60 million.
The Jane’s Defence Weekly report says Sri Lanka has asked that their requests be given the ‘utmost priority’ amid a deteriorating security situation and a fragile ceasefire.
The army’s shopping list has a combined value of USD20 million, while the air force’s requirements are worth a further USD38.1 million.
Jane’s Defence Weekly says that Sri Lanka is clearly looking to build up its military capacity and has also issued a plea to Pakistan to provide swift technical assistance for its T-55 main battle tanks and C-130 transport aircraft.
The army’s extensive wish list includes ten Baktar Shikan anti-tank guided missile weapon systems, 300 standard/tandem warheads and two training simulators; respectively worth USD1.5 million, USD4.5 million and USD120,000. (ENDS)
CIA sees ISI with Awe and Professional Jealousy !
Pakistan's Spy Agency ISI has a love hate relationship with CIA !
US funding ISI to help its war in Afghanistan !
WASHINGTON — As they complete their training at “The Farm,” the Central Intelligence Agency’s base in the Virginia tidewater, young agency recruits are taught a lesson they are expected never to forget during assignments overseas: there is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service.
Anjum Naveed/Associated Press
MASTER SPY Pakistan’s new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, (with Pervez Musharraf, left) used to run the I.S.I.
Foreign spy services, even those of America’s closest allies, will try to manipulate you. So you had better learn how to manipulate them back.
But most C.I.A. veterans agree that no relationship between the spy agency and a foreign intelligence service is quite as byzantine, or as maddening, as that between the C.I.A. and Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I.
It is like a bad marriage in which both spouses have long stopped trusting each other, but would never think of breaking up because they have become so mutually dependent.
Without the I.S.I.’s help, American spies in Pakistan would be incapable of carrying out their primary mission in the country: hunting Islamic militants, including top members of Al Qaeda. Without the millions of covert American dollars sent annually to Pakistan, the I.S.I. would have trouble competing with the spy service of its archrival, India.
But the relationship is complicated by a web of competing interests. First off, the top American goal in the region is to shore up Afghanistan’s government and security services to better fight the I.S.I.’s traditional proxies, the Taliban, there.
Inside Pakistan, America’s primary interest is to dismantle a Taliban and Qaeda safe haven in the mountainous tribal lands. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan, and especially the I.S.I., used the Taliban and militants from those areas to exert power in Afghanistan and block India from gaining influence there. The I.S.I. has also supported other militant groups that launched operations against Indian troops in Kashmir, something that complicates Washington’s efforts to stabilize the region.
Of course, there are few examples in history of spy services really trusting one another. After all, people who earn their salaries by lying and assuming false identities probably don’t make the most reliable business partners. Moreover, spies know that the best way to steal secrets is to penetrate the ranks of another spy service.
But circumstances have for years forced successful, if ephemeral, partnerships among spies. The Office of Strategic Services, the C.I.A.’s predecessor, worked with the K.G.B.’s predecessors to hunt Nazis during World War II, even as the United States and the Soviet Union were quickly becoming adversaries.
These days, the relationship between Moscow and Washington is turning frosty again, over a number of issues. But, quietly, American and Russian spies continue to collaborate to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, and to secure nuclear arsenals.
The relationship between the C.I.A. and the I.S.I. was far less complicated when the United States and Pakistan were intently focused on one common goal: kicking the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. For years in the 1980s, the C.I.A. used the I.S.I. as the conduit to funnel arms and money to Afghan rebels fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
But even in those good old days, the two spy services were far from trusting of each other — in particular over Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons. In his book “Ghost Wars,” the journalist Steve Coll recounts how the I.S.I. chief in the early 1980s, Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman, banned all social contact between his I.S.I. officers and C.I.A. operatives in Pakistan. He was also convinced that the C.I.A. had set up an elaborate bugging network, so he had his officers speak in code on the telephone.
When the general and his aides were invited by the C.I.A. to visit agency training sites in the United States, the Pakistanis were forced to wear blindfolds on the flights into the facilities.
Since the Sept. 11 attacks, C.I.A. officers have arrived in Islamabad knowing they will probably depend on the I.S.I. at least as much as they have depended on any liaison spy service in the past. Unlike spying in the capitals of Europe, where agency operatives can blend in to develop a network of informants, only a tiny fraction of C.I.A. officers can walk the streets of Peshawar unnoticed.
And an even smaller fraction could move freely through the tribal areas to scoop up useful information about militant networks there.
Even the powerful I.S.I., which is dominated by Punjabis, Pakistan’s largest ethnic group, has difficulties collecting information in the tribal lands, the home of fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. For this reason, the I.S.I. has long been forced to rely on Pashtun tribal leaders — and in some cases Pashtun militants — as key informants.
Given the natural disadvantages, C.I.A. officers try to get any edge they can through technology, the one advantage they have over the local spies.
For example, the Pakistani government has long restricted where the C.I.A. can fly Predator surveillance drones inside Pakistan, limiting flight paths to approved “boxes” on a grid map.
The C.I.A.’s answer to that restriction? It deliberately flies Predators beyond the approved areas, just to test Pakistani radars. According to one former agency officer, the Pakistanis usually notice.
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Related
Times Topics: C.I.A. Inter-Services Intelligence
As American and allied casualty rates in Afghanistan have grown in the last two years, the I.S.I. has become a subject of fierce debate within the C.I.A. Many in the spy agency — particularly those stationed in Afghanistan — accuse their agency colleagues at the Islamabad station of actually being too cozy with their I.S.I. counterparts.
There have been bitter fights between the C.I.A. station chiefs in Kabul and Islamabad, particularly about the significance of the militant threat in the tribal areas. At times, the view from Kabul has been not only that the I.S.I. is actively aiding the militants, but that C.I.A. officers in Pakistan refuse to confront the I.S.I. over the issue.
Veterans of the C.I.A. station in Islamabad point to the capture of a number of senior Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in recent years as proof that the Pakistani intelligence service has often shown a serious commitment to roll up terror networks. It was the I.S.I., they say, that did much of the legwork leading to the capture of operatives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
And, they point out, the I.S.I. has just as much reason to distrust the Americans as the C.I.A. has to distrust the I.S.I. The C.I.A. largely pulled up stakes in the region after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, rather than staying to resist the chaos and bloody civil war that led ultimately to the Taliban ascendance in the 1990s.
After the withdrawal, the American tools to understand the complexity of relationships in Central and South Asia became rusty. The I.S.I. operates in a neighborhood of constantly shifting alliances, where double dealing is an accepted rule of the game, and the phenomenon is one that many in Washington still have problems accepting.
Until late last year, when he was elevated to the command of the entire army, the Pakistani spymaster who had been running the I.S.I. was Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. American officials describe this smart and urbane general as at once engaging and inscrutable, an avid golfer with occasionally odd affectations. During meetings, he will often spend several minutes carefully hand-rolling a cigarette. Then, after taking one puff, he stubs it out.
The grumbling at the C.I.A. about dealing with Pakistan’s I.S.I. comes with a certain grudging reverence for the spy service’s Machiavellian qualities. Some former spies even talk about the Pakistani agency with a mix of awe and professional jealousy.
One senior C.I.A. official, recently retired, said that of all the foreign spymasters the C.I.A. had dealt with, General Kayani was the most formidable and may have earned the most respect at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. The soft-spoken general, he said, is a master manipulator.
“We admire those traits,” he said.
US funding ISI to help its war in Afghanistan !
WASHINGTON — As they complete their training at “The Farm,” the Central Intelligence Agency’s base in the Virginia tidewater, young agency recruits are taught a lesson they are expected never to forget during assignments overseas: there is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service.
Anjum Naveed/Associated Press
MASTER SPY Pakistan’s new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, (with Pervez Musharraf, left) used to run the I.S.I.
Foreign spy services, even those of America’s closest allies, will try to manipulate you. So you had better learn how to manipulate them back.
But most C.I.A. veterans agree that no relationship between the spy agency and a foreign intelligence service is quite as byzantine, or as maddening, as that between the C.I.A. and Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I.
It is like a bad marriage in which both spouses have long stopped trusting each other, but would never think of breaking up because they have become so mutually dependent.
Without the I.S.I.’s help, American spies in Pakistan would be incapable of carrying out their primary mission in the country: hunting Islamic militants, including top members of Al Qaeda. Without the millions of covert American dollars sent annually to Pakistan, the I.S.I. would have trouble competing with the spy service of its archrival, India.
But the relationship is complicated by a web of competing interests. First off, the top American goal in the region is to shore up Afghanistan’s government and security services to better fight the I.S.I.’s traditional proxies, the Taliban, there.
Inside Pakistan, America’s primary interest is to dismantle a Taliban and Qaeda safe haven in the mountainous tribal lands. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan, and especially the I.S.I., used the Taliban and militants from those areas to exert power in Afghanistan and block India from gaining influence there. The I.S.I. has also supported other militant groups that launched operations against Indian troops in Kashmir, something that complicates Washington’s efforts to stabilize the region.
Of course, there are few examples in history of spy services really trusting one another. After all, people who earn their salaries by lying and assuming false identities probably don’t make the most reliable business partners. Moreover, spies know that the best way to steal secrets is to penetrate the ranks of another spy service.
But circumstances have for years forced successful, if ephemeral, partnerships among spies. The Office of Strategic Services, the C.I.A.’s predecessor, worked with the K.G.B.’s predecessors to hunt Nazis during World War II, even as the United States and the Soviet Union were quickly becoming adversaries.
These days, the relationship between Moscow and Washington is turning frosty again, over a number of issues. But, quietly, American and Russian spies continue to collaborate to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, and to secure nuclear arsenals.
The relationship between the C.I.A. and the I.S.I. was far less complicated when the United States and Pakistan were intently focused on one common goal: kicking the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. For years in the 1980s, the C.I.A. used the I.S.I. as the conduit to funnel arms and money to Afghan rebels fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
But even in those good old days, the two spy services were far from trusting of each other — in particular over Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons. In his book “Ghost Wars,” the journalist Steve Coll recounts how the I.S.I. chief in the early 1980s, Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman, banned all social contact between his I.S.I. officers and C.I.A. operatives in Pakistan. He was also convinced that the C.I.A. had set up an elaborate bugging network, so he had his officers speak in code on the telephone.
When the general and his aides were invited by the C.I.A. to visit agency training sites in the United States, the Pakistanis were forced to wear blindfolds on the flights into the facilities.
Since the Sept. 11 attacks, C.I.A. officers have arrived in Islamabad knowing they will probably depend on the I.S.I. at least as much as they have depended on any liaison spy service in the past. Unlike spying in the capitals of Europe, where agency operatives can blend in to develop a network of informants, only a tiny fraction of C.I.A. officers can walk the streets of Peshawar unnoticed.
And an even smaller fraction could move freely through the tribal areas to scoop up useful information about militant networks there.
Even the powerful I.S.I., which is dominated by Punjabis, Pakistan’s largest ethnic group, has difficulties collecting information in the tribal lands, the home of fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. For this reason, the I.S.I. has long been forced to rely on Pashtun tribal leaders — and in some cases Pashtun militants — as key informants.
Given the natural disadvantages, C.I.A. officers try to get any edge they can through technology, the one advantage they have over the local spies.
For example, the Pakistani government has long restricted where the C.I.A. can fly Predator surveillance drones inside Pakistan, limiting flight paths to approved “boxes” on a grid map.
The C.I.A.’s answer to that restriction? It deliberately flies Predators beyond the approved areas, just to test Pakistani radars. According to one former agency officer, the Pakistanis usually notice.
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Times Topics: C.I.A. Inter-Services Intelligence
As American and allied casualty rates in Afghanistan have grown in the last two years, the I.S.I. has become a subject of fierce debate within the C.I.A. Many in the spy agency — particularly those stationed in Afghanistan — accuse their agency colleagues at the Islamabad station of actually being too cozy with their I.S.I. counterparts.
There have been bitter fights between the C.I.A. station chiefs in Kabul and Islamabad, particularly about the significance of the militant threat in the tribal areas. At times, the view from Kabul has been not only that the I.S.I. is actively aiding the militants, but that C.I.A. officers in Pakistan refuse to confront the I.S.I. over the issue.
Veterans of the C.I.A. station in Islamabad point to the capture of a number of senior Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in recent years as proof that the Pakistani intelligence service has often shown a serious commitment to roll up terror networks. It was the I.S.I., they say, that did much of the legwork leading to the capture of operatives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
And, they point out, the I.S.I. has just as much reason to distrust the Americans as the C.I.A. has to distrust the I.S.I. The C.I.A. largely pulled up stakes in the region after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, rather than staying to resist the chaos and bloody civil war that led ultimately to the Taliban ascendance in the 1990s.
After the withdrawal, the American tools to understand the complexity of relationships in Central and South Asia became rusty. The I.S.I. operates in a neighborhood of constantly shifting alliances, where double dealing is an accepted rule of the game, and the phenomenon is one that many in Washington still have problems accepting.
Until late last year, when he was elevated to the command of the entire army, the Pakistani spymaster who had been running the I.S.I. was Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. American officials describe this smart and urbane general as at once engaging and inscrutable, an avid golfer with occasionally odd affectations. During meetings, he will often spend several minutes carefully hand-rolling a cigarette. Then, after taking one puff, he stubs it out.
The grumbling at the C.I.A. about dealing with Pakistan’s I.S.I. comes with a certain grudging reverence for the spy service’s Machiavellian qualities. Some former spies even talk about the Pakistani agency with a mix of awe and professional jealousy.
One senior C.I.A. official, recently retired, said that of all the foreign spymasters the C.I.A. had dealt with, General Kayani was the most formidable and may have earned the most respect at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. The soft-spoken general, he said, is a master manipulator.
“We admire those traits,” he said.
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